Canadian Lotteries Say Federal Regulators Drew the Wrong Line on Prediction Markets

Key Points

  • On 27 August 2026, CIRO and the CSA issued joint guidance stating that sports and entertainment event contracts should not be regulated as securities or derivatives, but stopped short of directing them into any gaming framework.
  • The Canadian Lottery Coalition, representing lottery corporations across seven provinces, has formally registered to lobby provincial officials, calling the guidance insufficient before prediction markets grow further across Canada.
  • Polymarket has now blocked access in four Canadian provinces, while Kalshi entered through Wealthsimple’s regulated platform, and the two operators now represent sharply contrasting outcomes inside the same country.

Canada’s financial regulators finally told prediction markets where the boundary sits. Provincial lottery corporations want to know what happens on the other side of it.

On 27 August 2026, the Canadian Securities Administrators and CIRO issued a joint notice clarifying that event contracts based on sports and entertainment outcomes do not fall under Canada’s securities and derivatives legislation, and that CIRO would not approve dealer members to trade such contracts. CSA Chair Stan Magidson called it essential clarity for “investors and market participants.” The lottery sector read it as a half-measure.

“The Time to Act Is Now”

The Canadian Lottery Coalition (CLC), which represents gaming and lottery organisations across seven provinces, including Atlantic Lottery, Loto-Québec, Manitoba Liquor and Lotteries, and British Columbia Lottery Corporation, has registered to lobby provincial officials on the issue, arguing that prediction contracts still available to Canadian investors can function like gambling and should face stronger consumer protections. CLC Executive Director Molly Cormier was direct about her view of the August guidance: “We appreciate the further clarity, but I just feel like it’s too far to say that it’s a line in the sand. The time to act is now before they expand further in Canada.”

What makes this push more pointed than a typical industry complaint is the revenue question behind it. Unlike commercial betting operators, Canada’s provincial lotteries are Crown corporations; their profits flow into government budgets, funding healthcare, public education, amateur sport, and community programmes. Every dollar spent on an unregulated prediction contract is a dollar that never reaches those channels, and the CLC has made sure to say so explicitly in its lobbying position.

What the Guidance Actually Left Open?

The August joint notice was more precise than anything Canada had produced before on this topic, yet it was also narrower than lottery operators had pushed for. Under terms CIRO has already authorised, regulated contract dealers in Canada, currently Wealthsimple and Interactive Brokers, can still offer event contracts linked to economic indicators, climate-related events, and financial market outcomes. Sports and entertainment are now walled off. Everything else remains open, with regulators noting in the joint statement that they “continue to review these terms and conditions, which may be subject to further restrictions or other changes for these dealer members and any others in the future.”

That review clause matters. It suggests the permitted categories are not settled, but it also means the CLC still has no guarantee that broader restrictions will follow. Wealthsimple had previously published a white paper on 4 August arguing for removing the existing 30-day requirement for binary options and questioning whether traded sports event contracts should move into the gaming regulatory system at all. Wealthsimple’s position, that subject matter should not determine regulatory classification, sits in direct opposition to what lottery operators are lobbying for; one side wants a broader financial framework applied regardless of contract content, the other wants gaming rules applied regardless of how contracts are labelled.

Kalshi In, Polymarket Out

The two biggest names in prediction markets have landed in starkly different positions inside Canada, and the contrast tells a story about how platforms are reading the regulatory risk. Polymarket quietly updated its terms of service on 6 July to block access in Alberta, British Columbia, and Quebec, adding three provinces to the two-year ban it has been serving in Ontario following a 2025 settlement with the Ontario Securities Commission. Alberta’s iGaming Minister Dale Nally confirmed Polymarket acted on its own initiative, saying: “Polymarket made the decision itself to geo-fence itself out. I think that was good news.” Amanda Brewer, Senior Vice President of Policy and Communications for the Canadian Gaming Association, put the rationale plainly: “Given that Polymarket was fined and banned in Ontario, it is likely being cautious across Canada.”

Kalshi adopted the reverse approach. In June 2026, Wealthsimple in collaboration with Kalshi introduced the Wealthsimple Predict service for Canadian retail customers who could trade up to 4,000 events with an emphasis on the economy, finance, and climate change, not on sports events. The point was clear: while Polymarket withdrew from trading contracts that were related to sports even tangentially across a number of provinces, Kalshi approached Canada with a completely different set of markets allowed by regulators.

The Insider Trading Question That Has Reached the Banks

Beyond the gambling-versus-investing classification debate, one overlooked dimension of the prediction market expansion is how Canadian financial institutions are responding to the insider trading risk it creates. Royal Bank of Canada has barred employees with access to material non-public information from placing bets on prediction markets, communicating the ban through an internal employee bulletin. Bank of Nova Scotia’s personal trading policy similarly prohibits employees from trading on prediction-market platforms to speculate on financial markets, indexes, or companies, as reported by The Globe and Mail.

Toronto-based fintech lawyer Evan Thomas, speaking to the same publication, explained that Canadian securities regulators hold a broad public-interest power to act against market activity that is contrary to public interest, even where specific insider-trading provisions may not directly apply. Wealthsimple, for its part, has described three layers of surveillance in place on its platform: anti-money-laundering monitoring, order-routing surveillance conducted by the futures commission merchant routing client orders to Kalshi, and Kalshi’s own real-time market monitoring. Whether that architecture satisfies Canadian regulators over time is an open question the August guidance did not address.

A Global Trajectory Canada Cannot Ignore

The battle of regulatory forces in Canada occurs at a time when delays will become increasingly expensive. Prediction markets have already seen a worldwide trading volume exceeding $23.9 billion per month. Sports and political events generate the most transactions in this sphere. According to Bernstein analysts, the market may generate $1 trillion in turnover by 2030 due to institutional engagement and high-frequency trading companies getting involved. Currently, there are at least 20 US states that are suing prediction market firms such as Kalshi, Polymarket, and Robinhood because they believe that the contracts of sports events are unregulated bets. In January 2026, the World Lottery Association released a position paper saying that if a certain product generates a financial profit based on the result of a sporting event, then such a product is considered to be a bet, irrespective of how the operator calls it.

Expert Analysis

Here is what strikes us as the most consequential problem in how this has unfolded: Canada’s regulators produced a clear “not us” statement without producing a clear “then who.” The August joint notice deserves credit for explicitly closing the door on sports and entertainment contracts within securities law. But telling the market that these products do not belong inside one framework is not the same as directing anyone towards an alternative. Provincial gaming authorities are the only bodies with obvious jurisdiction over what has been excluded, and yet no province has moved to formally claim it.

The CLC registering as a lobby group is, in our reading, a signal of anxiety rather than confidence. With Bernstein projecting 370 per cent volume growth in 2026 alone, the window for coordinated provincial action is narrowing, and Canada’s fragmented patchwork of provincial gaming authorities has historically been slow to align. What we find harder to accept is the framing from platforms that subject matter should be irrelevant to classification. A contract that pays out based on a sports result, structured as a binary yes-or-no outcome, traded by retail investors on a mobile app, functions identically to a sports bet whether it is called a financial instrument or not. The CLC’s argument is not that prediction markets are harmful in principle; it is that equivalent products should face equivalent rules. That is a reasonable position, and regulators who dismiss it by pointing to a technicality in securities law are not actually resolving the question. They are passing it sideways.