Brazil Betting Ban: More Than R$1.5bn in Football Revenue Now at Risk

Key Points

• Temporary Measure 1,394/2026 mandates the removal of all betting branding by October 5th; platforms close down on October 6th, and 85 licenses lapse on October 25th.
• Brazilian Série A clubs have earned R1.03 billion from betting sponsorships in 2025; add to that the exposure they get through pitch-side and broadcasting, and well over R1.5 billion is on the line.
• Flutter faces a $70m revenue reduction; Betano operator Kaizen Gaming is preparing legal action; sixteen additional clubs joined the Supreme Court challenge by October 2.

10 Days – 3 Deadlines – But No Refunds

Brazil took two years to build a regulated betting system but only ten days to take it down. The Provisional Measure 1,394/2026 was signed by President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva on September 25 and went into effect immediately. The measure sets three different deadlines that no club can get out of. The betting brand has to be removed from shirts, boards and broadcast by October 5. Platforms close on October 6 and all 85 permits expire on October 25. The measure has to be approved by Congress within 120 days or else it lapses automatically.

The market which is currently on hold because of such deadlines was huge by 2025. According to the data from Brazil’s Secretariat of Prizes and Betting, the amount of revenue from regulated operators was close to R$37 billion in 2025. Operators had to pay R$9.95 billion in federal taxes and R$2.5 billion in license fees, which cost R$30 million each until 2029.

More Than R$1.5bn in Football Revenue Is at Risk

The direct impact on football is significant, though the total remains an estimated exposure rather than a confirmed measured loss. Série A clubs received R$1.03bn in betting sponsorship in 2025, up 67% year-on-year, per a Convocados survey conducted with Outfield. That figure covers only kit and direct commercial deals. Economist Cesar Grafietti at Convocados told NEXT.io that pitchside boards, dominated by betting buyers, represent at least another R$500m in exposure. Broadcast sponsorship packages tied to TV rights carry further risk, though those slots are considered easier to resell to other buyers. Combined, the annual football revenue at risk from this ban now exceeds R$1.5bn, with none of it yet confirmed as permanently gone.

It is precisely that exposure that marks the difference between manageable and unmanageable consequences for some clubs. Thus, in 2025, betting companies were responsible for 73% of marketing income in São Paulo, based on data from Sports Value. Corinthians planned R276.7m worth of sponsorships in 2026, of which R150m was from Esportes da Sorte, which expires in 2029. This loss alone represents 54% of their projected shirt income. Club wage bills and operating costs remain constant.

In terms of Série A clubs, Flamengo is at the highest level of exposure. Their partnership with Betano, valued at R268.5m a year, has not been terminated but merely suspended. The estimated loss for Flamengo could be up to R430m, and the total amount across Brazilian football could be around R$2.5bn, as Flamengo itself has claimed before.

Not Every Operator Is Walking the Same Path

Some brands are treating the provisional measure as a penalty-free exit from deals that had already underperformed. At Vitória, shirt sponsor 7K Bet invoked the MP to exit a contract due to run to 2027, paying no penalty. Santos chose the opposite path, with Novibet suspending its deal rather than cancelling it outright, keeping a return option open if Congress or the courts intervene.

Fabio Wolff, managing partner at Wolff Sports, does not expect suspended deals to resume at previous values even if the ban falls. “Regulatory risk now comes into the equation: if a company can’t predict how long it will be able to exploit that sponsorship, it tends to commit less money,” he told NEXT.io.

Global Operators Are Revising Their Earnings Guidance

The financial damage reaches well beyond Brazilian club budgets. Flutter Entertainment disclosed in its SEC filing that the shutdown could reduce its 2026 revenue by approximately $70m. Adjusted EBITDA could fall by $20m if Brazilian operations remain closed through the year. Flutter said it was “extremely disappointed by this development and is reviewing all available options, including the potential to appeal.”

Entain now expects 4-6% online NGR growth in 2026 including Brazil. Excluding Brazil, Entain confirmed it remains on track for the top end of its prior 5-7% guidance range, with underlying EBITDA guided to the lower end of £910m to £960m. Among operators, Betano’s parent faces the sharpest individual legal exposure. Allwyn, which holds a 36.75% stake in Kaizen Gaming, confirmed the company is preparing legal action to protect its Brazilian authorisation. Brazil had only fully regulated online betting in January 2025. Its closure has already moved earnings guidance at two London-listed operators, showing how much capital was committed before the government reversed course.

A Supreme Court Battle Growing by the Day

Club executives at several leading Série A sides discussed suspending the Brasileirão as a pressure tactic. Those involved described the idea as extreme even among themselves. A government meeting mediated by the CBF, scheduled for September 29, was cancelled after clubs refused to attend. Clubs argued the government had made the decision without consultation, then asked them to discuss the consequences.

ANJL and IBJR filed ADI 8027 with the Supreme Federal Court on September 28, challenging the provisional measure as unconstitutional. Justice Fux admitted Flamengo as amicus curiae in the STF proceedings on September 30, allowing the club to submit technical arguments without becoming a primary party. By October 2, sixteen additional clubs had sought participation in those proceedings, per UOL. Palmeiras, initially reported as likely to file its own action, decided against joining the STF proceedings for now.

Justice Fux has since requested government information and has not yet issued any ruling. Reporting from NEXT.io indicates a decision is unlikely to come before the October 4 presidential election first round. Leonardo Benites, ANJL’s deputy head of communications, told NEXT.io members will comply if nothing changes before October 5. “There will be no disobedience,” he said. A September Atlas/Bloomberg poll found 75% of Brazilians support banning betting outright, removing much of the political pressure that might otherwise push the government towards compromise.

Who Fills the Sponsorship Gap?

Candidates are emerging, though none come close to what is leaving. Fatal Model, an escort advertising platform, proposed more than R$100m for shirt space at Corinthians and reportedly approached Flamengo similarly; Flamengo publicly denied receiving or negotiating the offer. Chinese automakers BYD and GAC have grown their presence in Brazilian football this year. BYD sponsors Corinthians and Bahia, while GAC backs Flamengo, but both occupy secondary commercial roles rather than primary shirt space. Those values fall well short of what betting brands were paying.

Erich Beting, CEO of Máquina do Esporte, told NEXT.io that a like-for-like replacement at betting-level values is very unlikely. Betting operators “live solely and exclusively from the business of sport,” he said. Sectors like automotive and technology simply cannot justify those deal values in the same way.

Expert Analysis: The Industry Helped Create the Conditions for This Ban

We would be reading this story too narrowly if we placed the blame entirely on Lula’s executive order. Brazil’s betting market expanded at a pace that any honest reading of public sentiment should have flagged as unsustainable. In 2025, nearly every Série A main shirt sponsorship carried a betting logo. Operators outbid every other sector for the most prominent commercial properties in South American football. The industry generated nearly R$10bn in federal tax that year. Consumer spending on betting was simultaneously being treated as a public health emergency by courts and government ministries.

Self-regulation had an actual opportunity that was there for long enough to act upon. It required demonstrable progress in tackling problem gambling and proactively engaging regulators. This is exactly what safeguards any licensed industry from the backlash from the voters that becomes too much to handle. As Beting told NEXT.io, “the operators didn’t do their job, they didn’t care about the customer, and then the bill came, brutally, but it came.” England’s Premier League clubs voluntarily agreed to remove betting logos from shirt fronts before the 2026/27 season. Brazil reached the same point through confrontation rather than cooperation. The structural damage, as Grafietti warned, is not just the R$1.5bn in annual revenue now at risk. It is the legal uncertainty created when a government builds a regulated market and dismantles it within two years. Clubs, investors and operators now have to rebuild confidence from a position weaker than where they started.