Brazil’s Betting Market Files Petitions to Supreme Court While Lula Ban Timer Ticks

Key Points

  • ANJL filed ADI 8027 and Anseja filed ADI 8024 before the Supreme Federal Court, while ANJL and IBJR submitted a joint amicus statement to Minister Luiz Fux, all three targeting Provisional Measure 1,394 signed on September 25.
  • The measure introduced a phased shutdown: new deposits halted on September 25, betting websites go offline from October 6, and all 85 operator authorisations formally expire on October 25.
  • An IBJR-commissioned study estimated illegal operators held 38%-44% of Brazil’s fixed-odds bets in H1 2026, down from 41%-51% in 2025, progress the industry argues the total ban will now fully reverse.

When Deposits Stopped, the Legal Fight Began

Brazil’s President Lula signed Provisional Measure 1,394 on September 25, banning all fixed-odds betting and halting new customer deposits immediately. Within 72 hours, the industry had filed its first legal challenges at the Supreme Federal Court. Betting websites and applications must go offline from October 6, ten days after the measure’s publication. All 85 operator authorisations formally expire on October 25, 30 days after publication. Congress then has up to 120 days to approve, reject, or let the measure lapse entirely. ANJL filed ADI 8027 before the Supreme Court, directly challenging the measure’s constitutionality. Anseja filed its own action, ADI 8024, requesting the measure’s complete annulment. ANJL and IBJR also submitted a joint amicus statement to Minister Luiz Fux through three older proceedings, ADIs 7,721, 7,723, and 7,749, requesting the same suspension. As a fallback, both bodies requested a minimum six-month transition period if a full suspension proves impossible.

A Constitutional Argument Built on the Government’s Own Data

The industry’s challenge questions not the ban’s intent but the legal mechanism used to impose it. A Provisional Measure in Brazil legally requires demonstrated urgency before it takes immediate force. ANJL and IBJR argue the government cannot satisfy that constitutional requirement. Their filing cites SPA data showing betting financial volume fell 42% between October 2025 and June 2026. A market contracting by nearly half does not obviously match the kind of emergency a Provisional Measure demands. Seven days before the measure was published, the Secretariat was still updating its authorised operators register. The government also reportedly advocated for betting regulation during the Law 14.790/2023 legislative process, advising against amendments that would have restricted access for vulnerable groups. Building the licensed market, then invoking emergency powers to dismantle it, creates the structural contradiction the trade bodies are pressing directly in court.

BRL2.55 Billion Collected, Nothing to Be Refunded

The financial dimensions of this dispute reach considerably further than constitutional arguments alone. According to the industry’s filing, the licensed sector generated BRL9.95 billion in federal taxes in 2025, with licence grants adding BRL2.5 billion and inspection fees contributing a further BRL95.5 million. The government confirmed 85 authorisations at BRL30 million each, totalling BRL2.55 billion in licence fees collected from operators. Provisional Measure 1,394 states that license termination on public-interest grounds creates no right to compensation or fee reimbursement. The industry’s lawyers argue this constitutes confiscation under Brazilian law. Potential claims are expected to extend well beyond the BRL2.55 billion in fees. Technology infrastructure, staffing, compliance systems, and commercial agreements entered during the regulated period are all in scope. ANJL and Anseja also argue the measure omits a fiscal impact assessment that their reading of Article 113 of Brazil’s ADCT requires, though the government disputes whether that provision applies to this measure.

The Illegal Market Was Shrinking – The Ban Reversed That

The industry’s sharpest argument concerns the illegal market, and the supporting data was already public before the ban. An IBJR-commissioned study estimated illegal operators held 38% to 44% of Brazil’s online bets in H1 2026. That was down from 41% to 51% in 2025, when the licensed market was fully operational. Removing the legal alternative does not eliminate bettor demand; it redirects it to platforms operating outside Brazilian regulatory oversight. ANJL’s monitoring platform, Legibet, tracked 6,401 new illegal betting sites identified between September 22 and 28, a figure the industry cited in its court filings. A separate tool, Bet Legal, recorded a 160% jump in unauthorised betting domains between September 25 and 28, rising from 377 to 981 domains detected. Both platforms use different methodologies and track different events, so neither figure is directly comparable to the 506 sites the government’s joint task force reported taking down by September 27. But the direction all three point in is consistent. ANJL president Plínio Lemos Jorge stated: “The clandestine websites have expanded their offerings and continue to operate outside the law and oversight. Now, they will take advantage of the prohibition of legal betting to attract bettors to the illegal market.”

Football Clubs Facing Losses They Cannot Quickly Replace

Commercial implications of the ban extend much further than that of operators. Fourteen out of twenty clubs of Brazil’s elite league known as the Brasileirao have betting companies sponsoring their shirts; betting makes up 34% of the clubs’ overall commercial income in 2025 worth about $200 million. In terms of South American football history, Flamengo enjoys the most lucrative sponsorship agreement amounting to $46 million per year sponsored by Betano. “How am I going to pay for Paqueta?” was the question that Club president Luiz Eduardo Baptista posed regarding the ban. The player’s transfer this season cost the club as much as their sponsorship agreement.

The Justice Who Handles These Cases Already Voted Against Gambling

Justice Luiz Fux is the confirmed rapporteur for RE 966.177, Brazil’s landmark gambling case, and also leads ADIs 7,721, 7,723, and 7,749, the existing betting framework proceedings. The newly filed ADIs, 8027 and 8024, have been requested for distribution to him under the court’s related-case rule. In August 2026, Fux voted to uphold the 1941 law criminalising the operation of games of chance in Brazil, citing household debt and mental health risks as his stated reasoning. That vote has not yet secured a full majority, as Justice Flávio Dino paused proceedings to request more review time. It nonetheless establishes where Brazil’s primary gambling rapporteur currently stands when these new challenges arrive. The Attorney General’s Office requested 72 hoursbefore any injunction hearing could proceed. That procedural timetable made a formal ruling before the October 4 election difficult to achieve. Congress also runs a separate track that could prove equally significant. Provisional Measure 1,394 will lapse unless legislators approve it within 120 days, and with recess periods factored in, that window could extend to March 2027.

Expert Analysis

The framing this government chose raises questions that will not disappear with the law itself. Signing a provisional measure nine days before a national election, without a fiscal impact study or industry consultation, is a specific choice. We read that choice as political as much as it is a public health measure. The timing does work that the stated rationale cannot do on its own.

The 42% fall in financial volume before the ban is the piece of data we find hardest to dismiss. The industry argues it shows the regulated framework was already moderating the market. Our reading is more cautious: a declining volume does not prove regulation was working. It does suggest the system was producing some measurable effect worth understanding before dismantling it.

The illegal market argument the industry is pressing is not simply self-interested noise. The IBJR’s own commissioned study found illegal operators held 38% to 44% of Brazil’s bets in H1 2026, down from 41% to 51% in 2025. That decline coincided with the licensed market being fully operational. Whether regulation caused it or not, the government has now removed the only structural incentive keeping bettors on licensed platforms. The trend that the study documented will not hold without regulation in the market.

The license fees of BRL2.55 billion that were collected by the government of Brazil and declared as non-refundable instantly are certainly no small point to be overlooked. Investors, technology providers and sponsors all made their commitment based on five-year licenses granted by the Brazilian state. These have been withdrawn before the two-year period was even completed. It is not necessary that we must assume that the act of gambling is an innocuous one in order to find the process extremely uncomfortable.