Key Points
- Second quarter 2026 revenue of $731.1 million was up 5% year-over-year, along with an increase of 23.4% in EBITDA to $206.1 million owing to significantly reduced spending on marketing.
- Revenue from Disney Solitaire grew 288.6% year-over-year to $142.4 million, however, spending on user acquisition in Disney Solitaire is expected to drop by around 70% in the second half of 2026.
- Guidance for the full year remained at $2.75 billion to $2.85 billion in revenue, although management believes that results will end close to the low end of both ranges.
Second quarter results for Playtika released on 6 August 2026 painted two different pictures at the same time. The company’s revenue amounted to $731.1 million, showing a 5% year-over-year increase. The EBITDA grew by 23.4% to $206.1 million, resulting in an increased margin of 28.2%, as compared to 16.8% in the previous quarter. By most measures, the quarter was solid.
The recovery owed almost entirely to a planned reduction in marketing spend. Sales and marketing costs fell from $360.6 million in Q1 to $252.6 million in Q2. CFO Tae Lee had flagged this step-down to analysts earlier in the year; the quarter delivered on it. “Our second quarter reflected the investment cadence we outlined last quarter,” Lee said. “Marketing stepped down materially, margins expanded, and SuperPlay became a positive Adjusted EBITDA contributor.”
That last part matters. SuperPlay, the Israeli studio behind Disney Solitaire, cost Playtika $690 million in cash at acquisition in November 2024, with an earnout worth up to $1.25 billion tied to performance between 2025 and 2027. As SuperPlay exceeded targets, those obligations grew. Playtika paid a $461 million earnout in April 2026 alone. SuperPlay turning EBITDA-positive at least signals the studio is no longer a drag at the operating level.
Disney Solitaire Grew, Then Had Its Budget Cut by 70%
The figure that caught most analysts off guard was the planned reduction in Disney Solitaire’s user acquisition spend. CFO Tae Lee confirmed during the earnings call that SuperPlay’s overall marketing investment would drop by roughly 70% in the second half of 2026 versus the first half, with Disney Solitaire carrying “the largest single reduction in user acquisition spend.” The cut applies to a title still posting double-digit sequential growth.
Disney Solitaire generated $142.4 million in Q2, up 288.6% year on year and 15.5% sequentially, and came within $2.7 million of overtaking Bingo Blitz as Playtika’s top revenue earner. CEO Robert Antokol addressed the marketing cut directly. “We brought our marketing spending down, and the game still grew,” he said. “It only happens when the players you have added continue to stay with you, when they keep playing and they keep spending, and this is how we ask you to judge this business.”
His argument is that Disney Solitaire has reached the point where its retained player base sustains revenue without expensive acquisition campaigns. Lee reinforced that, saying the expected revenue decline from the 70% spend cut would be “nowhere close to that.” Whether that holds across two full quarters is the question H2 will answer.
There is additional context missing from most of the Q2 coverage. CTech reported in July 2026 that Playtika was in talks to sell SuperPlay to Tencent in a deal valued at up to $1.5 billion. The report noted that Playtika’s ballooning earnout liability, combined with approximately $2.3 billion in debt maturing in 2028 and 2029, had created serious balance sheet pressure. A company preparing to divest an asset does not typically increase spending on it. The 70% marketing cut, read alongside the Tencent reports, is harder to explain as purely an economics decision.
Fewer Players, More Spending Per Player
Operational data revealed by Playtika indicated an issue which would become more severe should acquisition of customers persist in declining. Daily average active users decreased 9.1% to 8 million, while monthly average active users reduced 17.3% to 24.8 million. The number of daily paying users fell by 2.9% to 367,000, compared with the analysts’ forecast consensus of 372,590.
On the other hand, the payer conversion rate increased to 4.6%, from 4.3% last year, and revenue per daily active user jumped to $1.01 from $0.87. Playtika is drawing more money from each active user even as the active user pool contracts. That works as long as the paying cohort remains stable, but the paying cohort depends on new players entering through user acquisition. With acquisition spending being cut sharply in H2, the risk is that paying users decline faster than per-user revenue can compensate.
Bingo Blitz fell 9.5% year on year to $145.1 million. June’s Journey showed better footing at $74.7 million, up 8.1% year on year. Neither provides growth capable of offsetting a Disney Solitaire slowdown.
Direct-to-consumer revenue reached $286.9 million in Q2, roughly 39% of total group revenue, up 63.1% year on year. DTC platforms carry payment processing costs of around 3% to 4%, far below standard app store commission rates. As the active user base shrinks, DTC’s margin advantage becomes increasingly important to protect overall profitability.

What the Guidance Figures Actually Require?
The company restated its annual revenue forecast for fiscal year 2026 at $2.75 billion to $2.85 billion and its adjusted EBITDA forecast at $750 million to $790 million; however, management anticipates that the company’s performance will be towards the bottom of those ranges due to its caution about consumer spending.
The first half produced $1.48 billion in revenue. Reaching the bottom of guidance requires approximately $1.27 billion across the final two quarters, or roughly $637 million per quarter. Q2’s $731 million makes that look achievable, but Q2 carried marketing support that H2 will not. The adjusted EBITDA requirement for the second half sits at around $419 million, slightly above Q2’s $206 million run rate, meaning margin gains from lower spending need to offset any revenue softness.
Expert Analysis
Playtika’s Q2 numbers are credible on their face, but the H2 setup is genuinely difficult to read. The margin recovery is real, the DTC growth is structurally meaningful, and management’s case for retention-led monetisation is coherent. What makes the second half harder is that the 70% marketing cut arrives just as the Tencent acquisition reports raised questions about SuperPlay’s long-term place within Playtika. If those talks are progressing, the cut makes sense as financial housekeeping before a deal. If they are not, then Playtika is betting that Disney Solitaire’s player base holds through two quarters of near-zero acquisition spend, while Bingo Blitz keeps declining and monthly active users erode at 17% annually. The answer will come in the Q3 report. Until then, Antokol’s instruction to judge the business by player retention is the only test that matters.